Peace of Mind in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy by Ludwig, Frederick J.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1948
Peace of Mind in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of
Privacy
Frederick J. Ludwig
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ludwig, Frederick J., "Peace of Mind in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy" (1948). Minnesota Law Review. 1332.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1332
"PEACE OF MIND" IN 48 PIECES VS. UNIFORM RIGHT
OF PRIVACY*
FREDERICK J. LuDWIG**
B Y 1890, when Warren and Brandeis' urged judicial recogni-
tion of a right of privacy, certain changes in living conditions
had already created need for a new tort. Close living and mass
urbanization came as a result of the industrial revolution and tide
of immigration. Mass produced goods needed mass markets and a
merchandising technique of high-pressure advertising was born. As
literacy and compulsory education became widespread, a new jour-
nalism emerged. Gossip columnists and human interest stories
swelled circulation to astronomical figures.2 New technology brought
the linotype, high speed printing press and instantaneous photo-
graph. What chance of survival was there for a life of dignity and
seclusion? What freedom from prying curiosity? What hope for
peace of mind? The common law with remedies formulated in a pre-
industrial age furnished no protection. Libel and slander were only
superficially appropriate because of the defense of truth. The ancient
but discarded maxim, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel,"
once the rule in criminal actions,3 demonstrated that making public
private affairs of another causes no less emotional disturbance be-
cause of the veracity of the disclosure.
In the last half-century, confusion has followed in the wake of
statutes and decisions on privacy in a few states, and enigmatic
silence about the right in the rest. Twentieth century technology
has brought the radio, television, newsreels and motion pictures.
National syndication of columns and international transmission of
news and photographs has broadened the reach of journalism. Ad-
vertising has overflown state barriers. Today, the typical invasion
*The author acknowledges many useful suggestions by William Hoppen.
**A.B., 1939,'M.Sc., 1942, College of the City of New York; LL.B.,
1945, Columbia University School of Law; Member of the New York Bar;
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
1. "The Right to Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
2. Cf. id. at 196: "The press is overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource
of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy
the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only
be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle."
3. De Libellis Famosis, 5 Coke 125 (1605).
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of privacy involves most of the 48 states. The purpose of this sur-
vey is to examine the problem in the light of legislative and judicial
experience with the new tort and to consider a solution in the form
of a proposed uniform statute.
I
Consideration of the origins of the right of privacy, the inade-
quacies of existing case law, the consequences of disguised recog-
nition of the right, the conflict-of-laws problems it presents, and
the shortcomings of existing statutes points to the desirability of
uniform legislation. It also indicates the scope and limitations of a
workable statute on the subject.
A. ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT
Early American judicial history of the right of privacy has
demonstrated the necessity of legislative action. In 1881, a Michi-
gan court in De i}Iay v. Roberts4 allowed recovery against a physi-
cian who unnecessarily permitted an unmarried, non-professional
man to accompany him at a childbirth without the patient knowing
his true status. Although the invasion was in the nature of an in-
trusion upon private activities, the mental distress was similar to
that produced by an unwarranted publication. This was the first
American case which recognized privacy as a legally protected
interest.5
A decade later came the Warren-Brandeis article.6 Concerned
with the unwarranted publicizing of private matters, the authors
examined a number of cases in which relief was afforded on the
grounds of property right, implied contract, breach of confidence,
4. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N. W. 146 (1881). Although the declaration was in
deceit, the court said (9 N.W. 146, 148, 149) : "It would be shocking to our
sense of right, justice and propriety to doubt even but that for such an act the
law would afford an ample remedy. To the plaintiff the occasion was a most
sacred one and no one had a right to intrude unless invited or because of
some real and pressing necessity which it is not pretended existed in this
case. The plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such a
time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it,
and to abstain from its violation."
5. But cf. Lakin v. Gun, Wright (Ohio) 14 (1831), (surprising man
and woman in woods after conspiring with woman to get the man there; re-
covery denied); Owen v. Henman, 1 Watts & S. (Pa. 1841) (noise dis-
turbing Sunday worshipper in church; recovery denied); Bankus v. State,
4 Ind. 114 (1853) (charivari party; recovery denied); State v. Brown,
69 Ind. 95 (1879) ; Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297 (La. 1811), Note,
16 Tulane L. Rev. 639, 640 (1942).
6. "The Right to Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890) has been fre-
quently referred to as the outstanding example of the influence of legal
periodicals on shaping the law.
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or defamation. They concluded that these cases were really based on
a broader principle entitled to separate recognition. If the common
law copyright protected literary creations before publication, why
should not the right of privacy prevent secrets whispered in the
closet from being shouted from roof-tops? The lower courts in
New York readily agreed. That year, the Supreme Court enjoined
the use of a photograph surreptitiously taken of an actress in tights.7
When an actor, who was also a law student, refused to consent to
the publication of his portrait along with that of another well-known
one, in a newspaper popularity contest, the editor of the paper was
enjoined.8 The Court of Appeals in Schuyler v. Curtis,9 recog-
nized the existence of the right of privacy in the name and likeness
of a person although it denied recovery in that case on the ground
that the right did not survive a deceased person.
The reaction to this liberal view came quickly in repudiation of
the new tort by the Michigan Supreme Court in Atkinson v.
Doherty.'0 The court denied an injunction to the widow of Col.
John Atkinson, restraining the use of his name and portrait on a
cigar label. The question of whether the right existed at common
law need not have been decided. As in the Schuyler case, the court
could have held that the right did not survive the deceased. It might
have resorted to a recently formulated limitation' that since the
Colonel was an eminent lawyer and politician, hence a public char-
acter, he had waived his right to privacy. Although it did find
that the plaintiff was harmed, the Court would give no relief be-
yond the offer of its sympathy. Overlooking its own earlier case,
the first American one recognizing the right, the Michigan Supreme
7. Manola v. Stevens, unreported, (see N.Y. Times, June 15, 18, 21.
1890) cited in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195. Marion Manola alleged that while
playing in "Castle in the Air" at the Broadway Theatre in a role re-
quiring her appearance in tights, she was photographed surreptitiously from
one of the boxes. A preliminary injunction issued ex parte restraining the
defendant from making use of the photograph.
8. Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N. Y. Supp. 908 (Super. Ct. 1893).
9. 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895). Defendant association sought to
erect a statue in memory of Mary M. Hamilton Schuyler as the "Typical
Philanthropist." The work was to be exhibited at the Columbia Exposition
in Chicago in 1893 alongside a bust of Susan B. Anthony, which was to be
called, "Representative Reformer." A nephew and stepson of the late Mrs.
Schuyler objected to the exhibition in such company.
10. 121 Mich. 373, 80 N. W. 285 (1899).
11. In Corliss v. E. W. Walker, 64 Fed. 280, 31 L. R. A. 283 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1894), the widow of a well-known inventor sought to restrain publica-
tion of his portrait and biography. The court distinguished "public" from
"private" characters. Ordinary people have the right to restrain such publica-
tion; but since Corliss sought and attained public recognition, lie had sur-
rendered his rights to privacy.
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Court consigned the right to the limbo of damnum absque injuria.
Following this, the two most controversial cases appeared with-
in a few years of each other. The facts were remarkably similar:
each involved the unauthorized publication of the plaintiff's like-
ness for advertising purposes. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 12 the majority of the New York Court of Appeals denied
recovery principally because Blackstone, Kent and other common
law commentators had not mentioned a right of privacy, and also
because it might lay open the courts to a vast amount of litigation
which would ultimately embrace the absurd. But in Pavesich v.
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.,'3 the Georgia court
found the silence of the common law not conclusive on its non-exist-
ence. If common law precedent would not support its recognition,
natural law did. The right was implicit in constitutional guarantees
of liberty. "Liberty includes the right to live as one will .... One
may desire to live a life of seclusion.' 4 The controversy provoked
by the New York decision was immediate and bitter. So sharp was
the editorial criticism by the New York Times" that one of the
judges found it necessary to defend the holding in a law review
article.'0 The next session of the legislature promptly enacted a
statute overruling the case.'7 For almost a generation, recognition
of the right has been in dispute.'$ While today judicial controversy
centers on the limitations of the right, rather than on its existence,
the initial struggle has done much to shape the contours of the tort.
12. 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902). Defendant, without knowledge
or consent of the plaintiff, printed and circulated in stores, warehouses,
saloons and other public places, about twenty-five thousand likenesses of the
plaintiff, a young woman, with the words, "Flour of the Family" and the
name of a milling company on each lithographic print.
13. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905). A newspaper advertisement extoll-
ing the value of life insurance, used an easily recognized likeness of the
plaintiff with caption indicating that he had life insurance, alongside a picture
of a shabbily clad man which was labeled, "The Man Who Does Not Own
Life Insurance." An injunction was granted.
14. 122 Ga. 190, 191, 50 S. E. 68, 70 (1905).
15. Aug. 23, 1902.
16. O'Brien, "The Right of Privacy," 2 Col. L. Rev. 438 (1902).
17. L. 1903, c. 132, § 2.
18. Against recognition: O'Brien, "The Right of Privacy," 2 Col. L.
Rev. 438 (1902) ; Note, 2 Col. L. Rev. 486 (1902) ; Lisle, "The Right of
Privacy (A Contra View)," 19 Ken. L. J. 137 (1931). In defense of a com-
mon law right: Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1890) ; Larremore, "The Law of Privacy," 12 Col. L. Rev. 612(1912) ; Ragland, "The Right of Privacy," 17 Ken. L. J. 85 (1929) ; Buxton,
"The Right of Privacy," 35 Law Notes 25 (1931); Green, "The Right of
Privacy," 27 Ill. L. Rev. 237 (1932) ; Kacedan, "The Right of Privacy," 12
B. U. L. Rev. 353, 600 (1932); Dickler, "The Right of Privacy," 70
U. S. L. Rev. 435 (1936) ; Nizer, "The Right of Privacy," 39 Mich. L. Rev.
526 (1941).
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B. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT: PUBLICATIONS
Various classifications of the mass of cases and statutes on
privacy have been suggested. Most of the situations fall into two
categories: invasions by publication and intrusions upon private
activities. Of these, cases involving publication have greater signifi-
cance from the point of view of uniform legislation. They are not
only more numerous than the other cases, but present problems
which require immediate statutory solution. In permitting recovery,
courts have been faced with the perennial problem of balancing the
individual interest in peace of mind and freedom from emotional
disturbance against the social concern in education and free dis-
semination of information. Four factors have emerged which de-
limit actionability of publicizing aspects of one's personality: (1)
use of a name or likeness; (2) substantiality of the use; (3) ends
served by publication; and (4) medium of publication. The quan-
tum of each element in the mosaic necessary for a cause of action
controls the extent to which the others need be present.
1. Use of Name, Portrait, or Likeness
What sort of appropriation of a name amounts to its use?
Since only natural persons have feelings, the use of a corporate
name infringes no right of privacy. In Vassar College z. Loose-
Wiles Biscuit Co.,' 9 the defendant used on packages and advertise-
ments a picture of a young woman in cap and gown waving the
college pennant together with an imitation of the college seal in
which the inscription, "Vassar College," was replaced by "Vassar
Chocolates." The court denied an injunction, noting that not only
was the college a corporation, "but a public institution, depending
upon and inviting widespread publicity for the fullest return from
the exercise of its functions as an institution of learning." 0 Except
for Utah, which gives a statutory right of privacy to public institu-
tions,2 ' this is the general rule and applies as well to partnership
names.
22
Does an individual who permits his name to become part of a
tradename surrender his right of privacy with respect to its sub-
sequent business uses? In Jaggard v. R. H. Macy & Co.,2 3 the
19. 197 Fed. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912).
20. Id. at 985.
21. Utah Code Ann., §§ 103-4-7 (1943).
22. Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N. Y. Supp. 56 (2d
Dept. 1916).
23. 176 lMlisc. 88, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1941). And see Tainer-
Brice Co. v. Sims, 174 Ga. 13,161 S. E. 819 (1931) (use of surname in corpora-
tion tradename) ; White v. William G. White, Inc., 160 App. Div. 709, 145
N. Y. Supp. 743 (1st Dept. 1914) (same).
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plaintiff, Ginette Jaggard, a well-known dress designer, after doing
business under the name, "Ginette de Paris," organized the "Ginette
de Paris, Inc." Exclusive use of the adopted name was granted
in connection with the sale of dresses to the corporation. The de-
fendant used the name "Ginette de Paris," to sell patterns of
dresses designed by the plaintiff. Relief was denied under the New
York statute. However, in Eliot v. Jones,2 4 President Eliot of Har-
vard consented to the display of his name on a set of books called
the "Harvard Classics" and "Dr. Eliot's Five-Foot Shelf of Books."
A rival publisher was enjoined, under the same statute, from pub-
lication of a cheaper edition called, "Dr. Eliot's Famous Five-Foot
Shelf of the World's Greatest Books."
If the function of the right of privacy is protection against
injury to feelings, and, not against monetary damages, then the
result in the Vassar and Jaggard cases is correct and in the Eliot
case, wrong. By consent to the use of his name and title as a trade-
name, Dr. Eliot surrendered his right of privacy with respect to its
subsequent business use on such books. No doubt there is a tort
here. Since purchasers might be confused, the authorized pub-
lisher could have his competitor enjoined from continuing the un-
fair trade practice. The right of privacy should not be permitted
to swallow the whole field of competitive torts. There is no remedy
however for commercial practices such as were found in the Vassar
case where there is no confusion of prospective purchasers and
the parties are not competitors. The possibility of grave damage
does exist in appropriation of institutional names. Although no
right of privacy is involved, American jurisprudence is developing
from the continental law of unfair competition a theory that such
appropriations of an established name, even in the absence of con-
fusion or competition, drain its glamour.
2 5
Whether the unwarranted use of less than a full name is action-
able, has resulted in an apparent conflict of opinion. Thus the use
of the surname "Pfaudler," was held not to invade privacy.26 The
court feared a flood of litigation from "Smiths," "Joneses" and
"Does." Yet when the comedian Ed Wynn published a booklet of
previously enacted radio dialogue, his announcer and foil, Graham
McNamee, was able to enjoin its sale because of the unauthorized
24. 66 Misc. 95, 120 N. Y. Supp. 606 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
25. Schechter, "The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection," 40
Harv. L. Rev. 813, 831-2 (1927).
26. Pfaudler v. Pfaudler Co., 114 Misc. 477, 186 N. Y. Supp. 725 (Sup.
Ct. 1921).
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use of his first name.2 7 The court found that in the particular con-
text, use of a given name was sufficient to identify the plaintiff.
The proper test should not be whether the name used is a full one,
a surname or a first name, but whether its use under the circum-
stances is sufficient to call the plaintiff to the public mind.
Confusion still surrounds the use of stage names, noms-de-plume
and maiden names. A federal district court held that the New
York statute did not protect stage names.2 8 The following year, the
circuit court of appeals stated in dictum its disapproval of this
view. 29 Married women may enjoin unauthorized use of their
maiden names, both where the common law right is recognized,
and under the New York statute.3 But in an unusual case, relief
was denied to an author who wrote under a nom-de-plume when
he sued a publisher who chose to use the author's real name.2 '
"Word portrayals," however, are not actionable representations. In
Toscani v. Hersey,32 the plaintiff's allegation that "Major Victor
joppolo" in the novel "A Bell for Adano" depicted plaintiff and
his war experiences, was held insufficient under a statute defin-
ing the right in terms of use of a "portrait." Such a restriction is
an arbitrary limitation on the right. The test should be formulated
not on the basis of the means used to produce the result, but on
whether there was identifiable representation.
27. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D.C.
Mass. 1934) aff'd as mod., 81 F. 2d 373 (C.C.A. 1st 1936).
28. Davis v. RKO Pictures, 16 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. N.Y. 1936). Plain-
tiff who as a psychic, palmist and actress used the name "Cassandra" was
denied recovery against producers of a motion picture called "Bunker Bean"
in which there was a character named "Countess Cassandra." Not only did
the two names materially differ, but both were derived from a mythical
Greek prophetess. The court held neither had a better right than the other.
29. Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F. 2d 891 (C.C.A. 2d
1937). Plaintiff had used the name "Aunt Jemima" as an actress in radio skits.
Since the defendant had previously used the title as a trade name for its
products, recovery was denied. In dictum the court found the New York
statute's application to a public or stage name seemed "inevitable." "If the
stage name has come to be closely and widely identified with the person who
bears it the need for protection against unauthorized advertising will be
as urgent as in the case of a private name; if anything, the need will be more
urgent." Id. at 894.
30. Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) ; Bailey v.
Bloomingdale Bros., 103 N. Y. L. J. 1533:3 (April 14, 1940).
31. Ellis v. Hurst, 70 Misc. 122, 128 N. Y. Supp. 144 (Sup. Ct. 1910),
aff'd w.o. opinion, 145 App. Div. 918, 130 N. Y. Supp. 1110 (1st Dept.
1911). Edward S. Ellis wrote under the nom de plume, Lt. R. H. Jayne, two
books which defendant published with both the real and assumed names on
covers and wrappers. The court held the right to publish under a nom de
plume included the right to use a true name.
32. 271 App. Div. 445, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 814 (1st Dept. 1946). See Note,
46 St. John's L. Rev. 73 (1946). Cf. Warren and Brandeis, "The Right of
Privacy." 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 214 (1890).
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The use of any name creates the risk of unintentionally
appropriating one belonging to a living person. The circumstances
of the use must determine liability. In Kerby v. Hal Roach
Studios, 1 a synthetic billet-doux signed "Marion Kerby" was
mailed to 1,000 men in Los Angeles to promote a film featuring a
fictional character of that name. The plaintiff also was named
"Marion Kerby" and was the only person so listed in the city's
directories. She was deluged by telephone calls from hopeful males
and had one visit from an irate wife who threatened to shoot her.
The court held that her privacy was invaded, noting that "it could
not but lead to misunderstandings between husbands and their
wives who saw the letter and put the worst interpretation on it;
it would arouse the expectations of lonesome males who were in-
terested in the promised evening * * *."
What sort of representation of an individual amounts to a like-
ness? Not only photographs, but an X-ray picture of a woman's
abdomen,"1 a statue,- and perhaps a vax figure,36 are sufficient
where the common law right is recognized. Under the New York
statute, a mannikin, for which a model posed, has been held to be
a "portrait or picture. '3 7 No accompanying name identifying the
likeness is necessary, 38 and even where an incorrect name appeared
in the caption, recovery has been permitted. 39 Camera accuracy is
not required where reproductions by lithograph 40 or caricature 4'
33. 127 P. 2d 577 (Cal. App. 1942). Written in feminine hand on pink
stationery, the note read (id. at 579)
"Dearest:
"Don't breathe it to a soul, but I'm back in Los Angeles and
more curious than ever to see you. Remember how I cut up about
a year ago? Well, I'm raring to go again, and believe me I'm in
the mood for fun.
"Let's renew our aquaintanceship and I promise you an evening
you won't forget. Meet me in front of Warners Downtown Theatre
at 7th and Hill on Thursday. just look for a girl with a gleam in
her eye, a smile on her lips and mischief on her mind!
"Fondly,
"Your ectoplasmic playmate,
"Marion Kerby."
34. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. N.Y.
1939).
35. See Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895).
36. See Monson v. Tassaudes, Ltd., (1894) 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 671 (re-
covery on libel theory).
37. Young v. Grenecker Studios, 175 Misc. 1027, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 357
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
38. Mlunden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).
39. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938).
40. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E.
442 (1902).
41. Tolley v. J. S. Fry & Sons, (1930) 1 K. B. (Eng.) 671 (re-
covery on libel theory).
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bear characteristic resemblance. And in an early case involving
motion pictures, the plaintiff was allowed to recover where the
only likeness used was that of an actor portraying him.42
2. Substantiality of the Use
Not every unauthorized use of a name or likeness for prescribed
purposes is actionable. The courts have qualified the right of
privacy by the rule of de minimis. When a writer for a pulp maga-
zine became so fascinated with the name, "Solly Krieger," that he
used it upwards of one hundred times in a twenty page story,
there was substantial use and no hesitation in permitting recovery
by a professional prizefighter of that name.43 But a single mention
in the novel "Show Boat" which ran to three hundred and ninety-
eight pages of the plaintiff's name, "little Wayne Damron," to add
local color was not actionable. 44
iore difficulty has been encountered in the application of the
rule to motion pictures. When cameras begin to grind off set loca-
tions invariably someone in a crowd scene protests. In New York,
when a plaintiff, whose name appeared on a sign attached to a fac-
tory building in a scene from a picture which purported to show
actual locations of the white slave traffic, sought recovery, it was de-
nied on the ground that the use was merely incidental.4 5 A sailor
who had posed for a Navy recruiting poster which appeared as back-
ground in nine feet of film in a picture of over eight thousand five
hundred feet, could-not recover. 6 It was stated that such a use did
not even amount to a "picture or portrait" under the statute. Yet
one close-up in a sightseeing film of a woman peddling bread and
rolls on the street was held actionable. 47 There is a vast difference
between what a plaintiff remembers of himself in a motion picture
scene and the impression that he has made on the audience. In rul-
42. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E.
1108 (1913). The first sea rescue using wireless message was depicted with
plaintiff radio operator portrayed by an actor. The film did not indicate
that the operator was an actor.
43. Krieger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N. Y. S.
2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
44. Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 133 Misc. 302, 231
N. Y. Supp. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
45. Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152
N. Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dept. 1915). The film was titled, "The Inside of the
White Slave Traffic."
46. Freed v. Loew's, Inc., 175 Misc. 716, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 679 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
47. The picture was called, "Sight Seeing in New York with Nick
and Tony." Blumenthal v. Picture Classic, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 800 (1st Dept. 1932), aff'd, 261 N. Y. 504, 185 N. E. 713.
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ing out trivial and absurd infringements, the doctrine of substan-
tiality is a desirable limitation of the right of privacy.
3. Ends Served by Use
a. Public Interest
Of the four limitations on the right suggested by Warren and
Brandeis, the one most widely applied by the courts has been the
first, vi-., that the right does not prohibit publication of any matter
of public or general interest. It is also the most confused area in
the field of privacy. Here the reconciliation of the conflict between
individual and social interests, depends in large part on mores and
value-patterns that vary with the court. What is legitimate public
interest or concern? One generally accepted distinction is betveen
fact and fiction. The unauthorized use of a name or likeness in a
work of fiction is unprivileged. 48 Occasionally courts may over-
look such use as unsubstantial. 49 Even then they are prone to dis-
tinguish legitimate fiction from the risqu6 story.50 The core of con-
fusion lies within the range of fact. If all publications of fact were
held to be matters of public interest, then the tort of invading
privacy would disappear into libel and slander. Several verbal dis-
tinctions have been attempted. One court has said that public inter-
est does not mean mere curiosity.51 Another has found a difference
between "ordinary inquisitiveness" and "unscrupulous abuse" of
a person's privacy.52 The earliest test to find favor was the distinc-
tion between public and private personages. Information about pub-
lic characters was said to be privileged since by pursuing an occu-
pation which called for general approval or patronage, they had
renounced the right to live screened lives. One can agree with such
applications of the defense as to the use of "Culbertson System" to
describe a technique of bridge playing perfected by one of the
48. Krieger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 167 Misc. 5, 3 N. Y. S.
2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
49. Swacker v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N. Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct.
1935). The district attorney's secretary was called "Swacker" in a film.
Plaintiff, Frank Swacker, formerly special assistant to the United States
Attorney General in prosecuting anti-trust cases, was denied recovery.
50. Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 170 Misc. 551, 9 N. Y. S. 2d
319 (City Ct. N.Y. 1938) (professional model recovers for publication of
photograph of self in neglige in magazine which, as court observed, was
devoted to risqu6 stories and semi-draped women).
51. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d
491 (1939).
52. Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27
N. E. 2d 753 (1940) (recovery denied plaintiff photographed in company
of police captain where no special damage alleged).
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litigants5 s But the doctrine has been so extended as to deny any
protection to those in the public eye. Thus a well-known actress
who alleged the expenditure of large sums to publicize herself as a
legitimate performer, was denied recovery against the owner of a
theatre sponsoring burlesque shows who exhibited a life-size photo-
graph of the plaintiff among nude and semi-draped likenesses of
his performers.
5 4
"Persons who expose themselves to public view for hire cannot
expect to have the same privacy as the meek, plodding, stay-at-home
citizen. The glamour, genuine or artificial, of that business, removes
the participants therein from the average citizen."
Apart from overextended application, the "public personage"
test is unsound. Implicit in the rule is the theory of waiver or con-
sent, yet it can hardly be applied to explain publications about per-
sons whose participation in events of general interest is involun-
tary,5 5 or whose only connection with the event is some relationship
to the actor and who have not participated at all.50 The focus of a
working rule should be not persons, but matters of public interest.
A realistic approach to its formulation would involve balancing
the individual interest in a private life against public interest in
news, information and education.
Contrary to the expectations of Warren and Brandeis, public
interest in news has provided a virtually impregnable defense to
the right of privacy. What sort of stories constitute news? Within
a single edition of a newspaper there is a vast range of timeliness
between the front-page headline and the inner page human interest
or rotogravure or Sunday supplement articles. And what is to be
done with items in current magazines, motion picture reenactments
53. Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct.
1934) (such use held no defense in unfair competition action).
54. Martin v. F. I. Y. Theatre Co., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 67, 10 Ohio
Ops. 338 (1938) (the actress was Mary Martin); Paramount Pictures v.
Leader Press, 24 F. Supp. 1004 (D.C. W.D. Old. 1938) (injunction denied
for use of names and pictures of actors in advertisements). Cf. Ruth v.
Educational Films, Inc., 194 App. Div. 708, 1 N. Y. Supp. 948 (1st Dept.
1937).
55. Jones v. Herald Post, 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. V. 2d 972 (1929) (re-
covery denied for newspaper photograph of plaintiff who was in company
of husband when he was stabbed to death on street).
56. Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., Inc., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911)(recovery denied for newspaper photograph of plaintiff on indictment of
father) ; Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction Co., Inc., 139 Misc. 290. 248
N. Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1931), rev'd, 237 App. Div. 863, 260 N. Y. Supp.
972 (3d Dept. 1932) (recovery denied for publication of photograph in court-
room of murder victim's mother in connection with article in True Detective
Mysteries).
57. 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 113 F. 2d 806 (C.C.A. 2d
1940).
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and radio dramatizations of past events? Three cases have raised
the question in a familiar pattern: do persons who have retired from
the public eye for considerable time regain the right of privacy en-
joyed by the obscure? In Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp.,7 the magazine,
"New Yoiker," published a biographical sketch of the plaintiff un-
der the caption, "April Fool," in a department called, "Where Are
They Now ?" Twenty-five years previously, the plaintiff was a much
publicized prodigy. At the age of twelve, he lectured to professors
on the fourth dimension. At sixteen, he was graduated from Har-
vard. The article described in merciless detail his present ob-
scurity as a lowly paid clerk who lived in a shabby hall bedroom
and as a hobby collected trolley transfers. The court denied re-
covery. It conceded that the plaintiff had gone to pitiable lengths
to escape publicity, but found a legitimate public interest in "the
misfortunes and frailties of others." In Melvin v. Reid,58 a motion
picture called "The Red Kimono" sought to dramatize the former
life of the plaintiff, once a prostitute and defendant in a famous
murder trial. She had since married and lived an exemplary life.
The court found no infringement of her right to privacy because
the details of the murder trial were already public record. But be-
cause of the use of her maiden name, recovery was permitted under
a clause in the state constitution guaranteeing the right to pursue
happiness. In Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc.,"9 a radio serial entitled,
"Calling All Cars," re~nacted a holdup and shooting in which the
plaintiff was the victim. The plaintiff alleged that he underwent
such mental anguish that next day he lost his chauffeur's job. The
court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint, and stated that
there is a point beyond which past events lose their privilege as
news. All three cases involved past events. Clearly they do not
turn on the factor of timeliness. It is difficult to find more public
concern in one story than in another. Is the shame of being identi-
fied as an accused murderess and former prostitute in the Melvin
case the same as the annoyance of being pointed out as an ex-
prodigy in the Sidis case? In the Mai case, the allegation of special
damage, so immediate and extreme, probably moved the court. If at
all, the cases may be distinguished in terms of the variation of the
individual interest in privacy.
The element of time in the case of those involved in the news
may make impossible the requirement that consent be secured in
advance. The same cannot be said of publications which are merely
58. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
59. 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
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informative. Yet an Alaska court denied an injunction against
taking motion pictures of a projected flight over the North Pole
after it had been alleged that such rights had been sold to another
company and the receipts were being used with other private capital
to make the venture financially possible. 0 The court found the ex-
pedition, "surrounded and clothed with a remarkable public inter-
est." judicial confusion surrounding public interest in information
is itself remarkable in cases involving motion pictures of sports
figures. Babe Ruth was denied recovery for films exhibiting his
home-run technique,6 while a golfer and a New York toreador
were found to have their privacy invaded by similar pictures
demonstrating respectively trick shots62 and the art of throwing a
bull.63
Strangely enough, public interest in education is given least
consideration as a privilege. In Almind v. Sea Beach Ry., 4 un-
authorized photographs of the plaintiff demonstrating the safest
way to enter and leave a street car, were found to invade her right
of privacy. A series of cases involving medical photography has
raised the issue more sharply. No question exists where the pictures
are exhibited generally for pornographic purposes.6 5 But in Clay-
inan v. Bernstein,6 an injunction was granted, in the absence
of publication or communication, against the use of private photo-
graphs taken by her physician, without permission, of a woman's
facial disfiguration. And the State's Attorney General has indicated
that the New York statute protects cancer patients against un-
authorized public exhibitions for educational purposes of their
photographs.67 In weighing an individual's interest in this kind of
case against the public interest, such factors should be considered
as: the degree of value of the likeness for prevention and treatment
of disease; the extent to which it will be exhibited to an audience
60. Smith v. Surratt, 7 Alaska 416 (1926).
61. Ruth v. Educational Films, Inc., 194 App. Div. 893, 184 N. Y. Supp.
948 (1st Dept. 1920). The films were called, "Over the Fence" and "Babe
Ruth, How He Makes His Home Runs."
62. Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 253 App. Div. 708. 1 N. Y. S.
2d 643 (1st Dept. 1937), aff'd, 277 N. Y. 707, 14 N. E. 2d 636 (1938).
63. Franklin v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 246 App. Div. 35, 248 N. Y.
Supp. 96 (1st Dept. 1935), aff'd, 271 N. Y. 554, 2 N. E. 2d 691 (1936).
The film featured Sidney Franklin and was called "Throwing the Bull."
64. 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N. Y. Supp. 842 (2d Dept. 1913).
65. Cf. Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N. Y. Supp. 481
(1st Dept. 1920) (plaintiff recovers for exhibition to general patronage in
film called "Birth" of pictures showing her Caesarian operation which she
consented orally to be shown only to medical societies).
66. 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940).
67. Ops. Atty Gen. (N.Y. 1934), 374.
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of a limited and professional character ;6 the uniqueness of the
subject for the purpose; and the difficulty of obliterating elements
that would identify the subject. Thus, in the Almind case, any
person might have been recruited for the accident prevention
photographs; but in Clayman v. Bernstein, only the plaintiff's face
could subserve science.
b. Advertising or Trade Purposes
In jurisdictions where either the common law or statutory right
of privacy is recognized, the unauthorized use of a name or likeness
for advertising or trade purposes is actionable. Where the statu-
tory right exists, a use must be made for this purpose or there
is no cause of action. In deciding what is such a purpose, no diffi-
culty is presented by such invasions as the unauthorized use of a
name or photograph in an advertisement, or a purported recom-
mendation, indorsement or testimonial.6 9 Occasionally, closer ques-
tions arise as, for example, the illustrative use of an actress' photo-
graph in a five-and-ten cent store locket.70 But confusion results
from the fact that most uses of names and likenesses are rarely for
a single purpose. Newspapers and magazines may publish articles
to satiate the public appetite for current information and enlighten-
ment, but they also do so to increase their circulation and profits.
Is not every news item then a publication for trade purposes ?71 In
answering this in the negative, courts must first determine what
the social interest is and balance the commercial purpose against
the publication's value as news, information or education. The
resultant of this process must then be weighed against the individual
68. But see Griffin v. Medical Soc., 11 N. Y. S. 2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1939)(recovery for photograph in medical journal).
69. E.g., Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364
(1909) (picture and forged letter of senator used in booklet by kidney
pill manufacturer) ; Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. C.
402, 18 N. Y. Supp. 240 (1891) (pretended facsimile of physician's signature
used on drug label and advertisement). But cf. Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav.
112, 50 Eng. Rep. 759 (1848) (prominent physician, Sir James Clarke, denied
injunction against druggist selling "Sir J. Clarke's Consumption Pills");
Dockrell v. Dougall, 80 L. T. (N.S.) 556 (1899) (id.).
70. Lane v. F. V. WNToolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 199
(Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1065, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 352 (1st Dept. 1939).
In rejecting defendant's contention that use of plaintiff's picture merely
invited purchaser to insert her own favorite photograph, the court said (11
N.Y.S. 2d at 200) : "The photograph was obviously used to bring attention to
the lockets on display, to make them more attractive. This is a use for 'adver-
tising' and for 'trade' purposes * * *"
71. Cf. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Co., Inc., 113 F. 2d 806, 810 (C.C.A. 2d
1940) : "Though a publisher sells a commodity, and expects to profit from the
sale of his product, he is immune from the interdict of sections 50 and 51 so
long as he confines himself to the unembroidered dissemination of facts."
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interest in privacy. Thus typical judicial efforts to arrive at a
stereotyped definition of "advertising or trade purposes," valid
for all cases, is foredoomed. However, this tendency is most marked
in jurisdictions having the statutory right because the legislative
language makes of this purpose a single test. The absurdity of the
rigid formula is demonstrated by one case holding that the use of
the plaintiff's photograph in a humorous cartoon would not be a
trade purpose if the cartoon appeared in a single newspaper, but
the syndicated sale of the cartoon to a number of them made the
use one for "trade purposes. ' 72 Making a commercial purpose the
sole criterion for the existence of an invasion, unduly restricts the
scope of the tort and dangerously expands it into areas protected
by the more systematic rules of unfair competition.
4. Medium of Publication
Independent of the ends served by the publication, a factor in
determining the existence of an invasion of privacy, is the par-
ticular medium used, whether newspaper, magazine, motion picture
or radio. The almost absolute privilege conferred on news because
of great public concern in current events and the impossibility of
obtaining consent in advance extends almost to the entire contents
of a newspaper. In this atmosphere of immediate public interest,
the privilege of the front page bulletin is frequently carried over to
the weird story in the Sunday supplement. It manifests itself in
one way as justification for the inclusion of names and photographs,
sometimes only tenuously related to the matter reported. Thus a
well-known Hindu musician was denied recovery for the use of his
photograph in a magazine supplement story called "I Saw the
Famous Rope Trick (But It Didn't Really Happen) ."1 Neither a
mother nor a daughter could recover for publication of their pic-
tures in connection with stories concerning principals in criminal
proceedings in which they had absolutely no part.74 Yet in M]iller v.
M~adison Square Garden Corp.,7 5 the plaintiff, a non-participant,
recovered for the use of his name and photograph where the medium
of publication was the official program of a certain sporting event.
72. McNulty v. Press Pub. Co., 136 Misc. 833, 241 N. Y. Supp. 29
(Sup. Ct. 1930)..
73. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
74. Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction Co., Inc., 139 Misc. 290, 248
N. Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1931), rev'd, 237 App. Div. 863, 260 N. Y. Supp.
972 (3d Dept. 1932); Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., Inc., 64 Wash. 691, 117
Pac. 594 (1911).
75. 176 Misc. 714, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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Another way the atmosphere effect of newspaper publication
extends the news privilege, is in the condonation by the courts of in-
correct representations and deliberate alterations. In Jones v. Her-
ald Post Co.,70 where the plaintiff's husband was murdered in a
street robbery, the attribution of an absurdly heroic statement,
which had never been made, to the plaintiff, did not move the court
to find an invasion of her privacy. And where a woman had posed
at an airport, in a group picture of five, including husband and
chauffeur, the publication of the photograph of the chauffeur and
herself with the others deleted, in connection with a story of her
husband's alienation of affections action against the chauffeur and
divorce proceedings against her, was held not to violate her right
of privacy."
Although no element of timeliness exists, courts will investigate
the nature of the publication to find a privilege where invasions by
magazines are involved. The National Police Gazette used the
photograph of the plaintiff, a high diver, together with those of
four other female vaudeville performers, under the caption, "Five
of a Kind on This Page. Most of Them Adorn the Burlesque Stage;
All of Them are Favorites of the Bald-headed Boys." Recovery
was denied.78 The court found the Police Gazette to be an "informa-
tive" periodical and hence outside the prohibition of the New
York statute, this despite its devotion to pictures of pugilists,
wrestlers, athletes, vaudeville performers, and prize dogs.
While no difficulty is encountered in permitting recovery for
unauthorized use of a likeness when motion pictures involve fic-
tional plays, 70 or even factual scenes exhibited for advertising 0 or
sex8 l purposes, courts have generally denied motion pictures any
privilege. This has been done on the theory that while a reader buys
his newspaper or periodical to be informed, when he goes to the pic-
tures he pays to be amused. Even informative films must be viewed
in the light of this mental set. Certainly this doctrine is absurd in
the case of newsreels. If the inability to secure consent beforehand
76. 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. 2d 972 (1929).
77. Thayer v. Worchester Post Co., Inc., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N. E.
292 (1933). Cf. Middleton v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 162 Misc. 516, 295
N. Y. Supp. 120 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (recovery denied to unemployed model
described as hotel cigaret girl in column called "The Inquiring Photographer"
since column not used for advertising or trade purposes).
78. Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 999 (2d Dept. 1914).
79. Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
80. Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
81. Cf. Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N. Y. Supp. 481
(1st Dept. 1920).
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justifies a high degree of privilege for newspapers, the same privi-
lege should exist for newsreels. Not only is time, in either case
equally scarce, but the difficulty of securing waivers in the latter
case increased many fold. A news story may describe a crowd,
parade or riot without names or likenesses; a newsreel cannot.
While this tendency has persisted, courts show signs of abandoning
it. Thus such a human interest item as a newsreel involving cor-
pulent reducing women, one of whom later objected, was held not
to violate her right of privacy.82 And scenes of a woman attorney-
turned-amateur detective, in the act of assisting the police to solve
a murder mystery, were similarly held privileged.8 3
By analogy to the old distinction between libel and slander, it
has at times been recommended as a prerequisite to redress for
invasion of privacy by oral publication that proof be made of spe-
cial damages, or that recovery be denied under any circumstances
for oral violation of the right.8 4 The ancient maxim, ora volant,
verba inanent, hardly meets the situation created by the modern
radio broadcast. Nevertheless, the requirement of special damages
still does appear necessary for recovery.s5
C. INTRUSIONS UPON PRIVATE AFFAIRS
The publication of some aspect of personality for commercial
purpose was probably the kind of tort contemplated by Warren
and Brandeis. This is the only right of privacy protected by exist-
ing statutes. However, in most states recognizing the common law
right, publication is not the only method by which privacy may be
invaded. s 6 If the gist of the action is the emotional disturbance
produced by unreasonable interference with peace of mind, other
means calculated to bring about this result should also be action-
able. Thus courts have permitted recovery in various situations in-
volving intrusions upon private affairs:
Eavesdropping. Unauthorized interception of private conversa-
82. Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. N.Y. 1931).
83. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 101 Misc. 3, 167 N. Y.
Supp. 98 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 182 App. Div. 882, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1112
(1st Dept. 1918).
84. Cf. Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S. W. 2d 510(1943), Note, 30 Corn. L. Q. 398 (1945) ; Warren and Brandeis, "The
Right to Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 217 (1890).
85. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
86. See McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 60 Ga. App.
92, 102, 2 S. E. 2d 810 (1939) : " * * we think that under the decisions a
person's privacy is invaded, in a case like the present, even though the in-
formation obtained be restricted to the immediate transgressor. Publication or
commercialization may aggravate, but the individual's right to privacy is
invaded and violated nevertheless in the original act of intrusion."
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tions by dictaphone 7 or wiretapping 8 notwithstanding the absence
of publication has been held to invade privacy.
Impersonations. In the absence of commercial purpose, the un-
authorized use of another's name has frequently been held action-
able. Thus affixing for political advantage another's name to a tele-
gram urging gubernatorial veto of a certain bill, 8 or using the
name of a national figure to endorse a local party,90 certainly in-
fringe on the right of privacy. Injunction has also been granted
against a wife and vital statistics bureau to restrain them from us-
ing the husband's name as father of a child shown to be a bastard."
However, courts have generally denied such relief to a wife who
seeks to restrain her husband and his companion from holding
themselves out as married.
92
Publicizing bad debts. Courts have ordinarily protected the sen-
sitive debtor against his irate creditor who in order to collect in-
vokes publicity. The question of degree of undue publicity is not
difficult when a garageman notifies a former customer that his pay-
ment is past due by means of a sign, five feet by eight, posted in his
window.93 Closer questions perhaps are encountered when the dis-
appointed creditor leaves large yellow cards, advising prompt pay-
ment, conspicuously scattered about the debtor's residence, or mails
bright red envelopes to him, plainly marked on the outside, "For
Collecting Bad Debts." 9 4 When accounts are advertised for sale
a different question is presented. No invasion of privacy was found
where a creditor distributed orange-colored handbills, listing by
name, address and amount due, the plaintiff and twenty-three other
debtors under the heading, "Accounts For Sale." 95 Although the
information was correct, resort to such unorthodox methods to
effect assignments is obviously calculated to enlist public opinion as
a collection agent. A disappointed creditor's threat of garnishment
made to the debtor's employer probably is not unjustified.96
87. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 60 Ga. App. 92,
2 S. E. 2d 810 (1939).
88. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. 2d 46 (1931).
89. Hinish v. Meier & F. Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P. 2d 438 (1941).
90. See State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317
(1924). Cf. Schwartz v. Edrington, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660 (1913).
91. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 At. 97 (1907).
92. E.g., Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 612, 166 N. E. 344 (1929);
Hodecker v. Strickler, 20 App. Div. 245, 46 N. Y. Supp. 808 (4th Dept. 1897).
93. Brents v. TMorgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927).
94. Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S. W.
558 (1918) (recovery allowed).
95. Judevine v. Benzies-Mfontanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis.
512, 269 N. W. 295 (1936).
96. See Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 127 Wash.
252, 177 P. 2d 896 (1947), Note, 22 Wash. L. Rev. 229 (1947).
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Courts reluctant to recognize privacy occasionally allow recovery
for libel. Where a pharmacist inserted, "Wanted, E. B. Zier, M.D.,
to pay a drug bill," in a want-ad column, an action in libel was
found sufficient although the words concededly were not defama-
tory.
Crime detection. Usually separate statutes govern the return
by police of suspects' photographs, measurements and fingerprints.
Although some doubt exists concerning photographs, 8 retention
of fingerprints, notwithstanding the plaintiff's innocence, generally
is held not to invade his privacy.99 It is not clear whether secret
shadowing by private detectives infringes privacy.100 Certainly
"rough" shadowing, of the open variety and without any attempt
at secrecy, is actionable.' 0 '
Intrusions upon private quarters. At two points the right of
privacy converges with real property law. Courts early demon-
strated a willingness to protect the privacy of quarters against in-
trusions, particularly when the occupant is a female and the hour
late. 0 2 They have often resorted to trespass quare clausumn in cases
which can only be explained as violations of privacy rather than
possession. On the basis of property rights alone, an adjoining land-
owner cannot be enjoined from erecting and maintaining windows
overlooking a plaintiff's property. 0 3 Yet recovery has been allowed
97. Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N. W. 862 (1885) ; see Muetze v.
Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123 (1890).
98. See State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N. E. 2d 755 (Ind. 1946),
Note, 26 B. U. L. Rev. 526 (1946).
99. Bartletta v. McFeely, 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 AtI. 17 (1930), aff'd,
109 N. J. Eq. 241, 156 AtI. 658 (1931); Miller v. Gillepsie, 196 Mich. 423,
163 N. W. 22 (1917) ; Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122(1915); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 AtI. 653 (1909) ; see Mabry v.
Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S. W. 746 (1909). But cf., State ex rel. Reed v.
Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S. W. 2d 834 (1941).
100. See People v. Weiler, 179 N. Y. 46, 71 N. E. 462 (1904) (secret
shadowing not disorderly conduct within penal statute).
101. Schultz v. Frankfort M. Accident & P. G. Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537,
159 N. W. 386 (1913).
102. Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S. E. 905 (1924) (passen-
ger aboard vessel enters woman's stateroom at night and attempts to have
sexual intercourse) ; Emmeke v. De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (C.C.A. 8th 1923)
(hotel detective accuses woman in room with husband at night) ; McGlone
v. Hauger, 56 Ind. App. 243, 104 N. E. 116 (1913) (housekeeper forced to
leave room by window when employer enters late at night to ravish her) ;
Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906) (persistent collector by
constant interrogation causes premature birth to pregnant woman) ; Newell
v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 38 Am. Rep. 703 (1880) (entry by householder into
guestroom in middle of night to solicit sexual intercourse with blind music
teacher).
103. Schafer v. Baker, 16 App. D. C. 213 (1900) ; Turner v. Spooner,
(1861) 30 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 801; Bryant v. Sholars, 104 La. 786, 29 So. 350
(1901).
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for invasion of privacy occasioned by a neighboring county jail
and its profane inmates,10 4 and by an elevated railroad and peeping
passengers. 0 5
The almost infinite variety1 6 of instances in which privacy may
be invaded even in the absence of commercial purpose or publica-
tion, requires a more general definition of the right than it has here-
tofore been given by statute.
D. PROBLEM OF CONSENT
In jurisdictions recognizing the common law right of privacy,
the right may be lost, like all personal ones, by estoppel, 0 7 the doc-
trine of unclean hands, 0 s or consent. Consent may be written or
oral; but when oral, courts will not seize upon words divorced
from surrounding circumstances to find acquiescence. Where a
patient was hospitalized, allegedly because of drinking a bottled
beverage, her statement to the defendant's attorney that he was free
to make any investigation about her to establish the truthfulness of
her claim, did not authorize him to install a dictaphone in her
room.10 Consent may also be implied from conduct and surround-
ing circumstances. But in applying the theory of waiver to public
persons on the ground that they have surrendered their right of
privacy, courts have been indiscriminate." 0 Many jurisdictions have
modified the public personage rule to the extent of protecting them
against unauthorized uses of names and likenesses unrelated to
their public life."'
104. Pritchett v. Knox County, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N. E. 32 (1908).
105. Moore v. N. Y. Elevated Ry. Co., 130 N. Y. 523, 29 N. E. 997(1892).
106. Cf. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N. J. Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (1940)
(to require wife accused of adultery to submit to blood test for paternity of
child would invade her privacy).
107. Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Phila. 263, 44 Phila. Leg. Int. 252 (1887)
(writer of letter by publishing it loses right to injunction against subsequent
publication by another).
108. In Western U. Teleg. Co. v. McLaurin, 103 Miss. 273, 66 So. 739(1914), plaintiff was denied recovery for disclosure of telegrams sent him
by a prostitute since "publication of the telegrams did not disclose the char-
acter of the sender. It was necessary for the plaintiff's case that he should
disclose her business * * *. He could not 'open his case' without confessing
his criminal intimacy with the courtesan, and it was his relations with
the woman that brought about his shame--and it was this shame that pro-
duced the injury or actual damage."
109. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 60 Ga. App. 92,
2 S. E. 2d 810 (1939).
110. See note 54, supra.
111. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909).
Cf. Eliot v. Jones, 66 Misc. 95, 120 N. Y. Supp. 606 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ; Edison
v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907).
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The New York, 1 2 Utahl"' and Virginia"a4 statutes require con-
sent in writing. In New York, the courts at first construed the
statute strictly,"' and neither consent of an oral nature,"" nor a
course of conduct from which consent might be implied, 1 7 was
recognized as a defense. Later, in reaction to the manifest injustice
of this, oral consent and estoppel were accepted in various ways as
partial defenses. Where the plaintiff had orally consented in ad-
vance, verdicts of six cents were either found to be not against the
weight of evidence," 9 or even directed." 8 Both oral120 and implied
consent"' were later accepted as pleas in mitigation of damages.
And where injunctive relief was sought, the court has refused to act
in the face of conduct amounting to consent on the theory of un-
clean hands.
22
The parol evidence rule applies where written consent has been
obtained. Thus, oral understandings limiting the scope of the writ-
ing may not be pleaded."' But consent may be limited or condi-
tional in view of surrounding circumstances."24 It has been held that
112. N. Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51.
113. Utah Code Ann. §§ 103-4-7-103-4-9 (1943).
114. Va. Code § 5782 (Michie et al., 1942).
115. Porter v. American Tobacco Co., 140 App. Div. 871, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 710 (2d Dept. 1910) (failure to obtain written consent must be pleaded
and proved as part of plaintiff's cause of action).
116. Almind v. Sea Beach Ry., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N. Y. Supp.
842 (2d Dept. 1913) (plaintiff recovers although oral consent was given
prior to publication of photographs).
117. Hammond v. Crowell Pub. Co., 253 App. Div. 205, 1 N. Y. S. 2d
728 (1st Dept. 1938).
118. Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 176 Misc. 714, 28 N. Y. S.
2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (directed verdict of six cents for plaintiff who gave
oral consent and admitted suffering no shame or humiliation).
119. Harris v. H. W. Gossard Co., 194 App. Div. 688, 185 N. Y. Supp.
861 (1st Dept. 1921) (verdict of six cents held sufficient after oral consent by
plaintiff established).
120. Buscelle v. Conde Nast Pub., Inc., 173 Misc. 674, 19 N. Y. S. 2d
129 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (oral consent of parent).
121. Cf. Sidney v. A. S. Beck Shoe Corp., 153 Misc. 166, 274 N. Y.
Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (on motion to strike, defendant allowed to plead
in mitigation of damages theatrical custom of encouraging advertising pub-
licity for stars, after use of Sylvia Sidney's name andophotograph on shoe
advertisement); Lane v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N. Y. S.
2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1065, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 352 (1st
Dept. 1939) (fact that plaintiff actress made no demand before suit and de-
fendant did not know consent had not been obtained held good partial de-
fense in mitigation of at least exemplary damages)
122. Wendell v. Conduit Mach. Co., 74 Misc. 201, 133 N. Y. Supp. 758
(Sup. Ct. 1911) (plaintiff voluntarily posed for photograph knowing pur-
pose for which it was to be used).
123. Merendi v. General Cigar Co., 103 N. Y. L. J., 1113:6 (March 12,
1940).
124. Young v. Greneker Studios, 175 Misc. 1027, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 357
(Sup. Ct. 1941) (professional model who posed at direction of her em-
ployer for defendant, solely to enable him to make a mannikin for the em-
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consent is a bare license or permission which may be revoked at
any time.12 Thus under the New York statute, a perfume manu-
facturer who after obtaining written consent of the plaintiff, had
expended large sums in exploiting the trade name, "Parfum Mary
Garden" was enjoined from further use of the name when twenty
years later she changed her mindY.1 2 Clearly the result is unjust.
Whether or not consent is a revocable license, a court of equity
has discretion to refuse to act when the plaintiff's conduct is char-
acterized by estoppel, laches and unclean hands.
The statutory requirement of written consent, designed to pro-
tect unwary plaintiffs, has operated too frequently to ensnare in-
nocent defendants. Since the statutory protection is for the benefit
of the individual, he should be considered to have the privilege of
waiving it. The requirement of a writing may diminish fraudulent
defenses; but it also increases the opportunities for fraudulent
claims. The central issue should be not the form of consent, but its
authenticity. Distinctions between written and oral evidence of
consent, without affecting admissibility, may properly be considered
to influence its weight.
E. SURVIVAL OF THE RIGHT
More confusion surrounds the question of survival of the right
than any other of its aspects. Uniform legislation would solve all
of the three 27 problems involved: (1) Where invasion takes place
during a person's lifetime, may an action be brought by others in
his name after death? (2) Does an action, commenced for invasion
during lifetime, abate with the death of either the plaintiff or the
defendant? (3) Where an invasion occurs after death, can sur-
viving relatives or representatives recover in their own rights?
(1 and 2) Where there are no survival statutes, the answer
to the first two questions must be in the negative. The common
law sharply distinguished personal rights from surviving ones of
ploycr, recovered when numerous mannikins made in her form and features
were sold to others).
125. State ex rel. La Follette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317
(1924).
126. Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, 151 Misc. 692, 271 N. Y. Supp. 187
(Sup. Ct. 1933).
127. A related problem is whether invasion of one living person's right
gives a cause of action to another based on some relationship. Cf. Clayman v.
Bernstein, 38 Pa. D & C 543 (1940) (joint action by husband and wife
for medical photograph of latter's face upheld) ; Von Thodorovich v. Franz
Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 Fed. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907) (Austro-Hungarian
consul granted injunction restraining use of Emperor's name) with Murray
v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 8 Misc. 36, 28 N. Y. Supp. 271 (Com.
P1. 1894) (father has no right to maintain action for publication of infant
daughter's portrait).
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property. 2 Tort actions, even including ones classed as involving
rights of property, did not survive. Since inanimate things cannot
have rights, "property" rights must also be personal, and the
ancient distinction is illusory. Nevertheless, survival of a privacy
action must depend on legislation. A few states have statutes pro-
viding for the survival of all actions. 129 Under these, no question
of survival or abatement of privacy as distinguished from other
actions is presented. Other states have survival statutes including
only certain interests in property or persons, or both. Many of these
were enacted before the right of privacy came into being. Some of
them expressly denied survival in libel and slander, actions closely
akin to privacy.2 0 Because of variations between the statutes of
different states, no generalization can be made. 13 Recent judi-
cial -32 and legislative28 action indicate that early cases2 4 holding
privacy actions to abate have been repudiated.
(3) The question of whether a cause of action exists in a de-
ceased person's memory was at first answered in the negative: "It
is a right of the living and not of the dead."'13 Later cases have
abandoned this position. Thus where a hospital permitted news-
paper photography of a deformed infant's nude corpse, the parents
were allowed to recover. 38 And where a photographer was em-
ployed to make a dozen pictures of the corpses of Siamese twins,
an action by the parents was sustained when additional copies were
made and copyrighted.3 7 In New York 13 8 the statute confines the
128. 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1923) 576-585.
129. E.g.. N. Y. Decedent Estate Law §119: "No cause of action for
injury to person or property shall be lost because of the death of the person
in whose favor the cause of action existed."
130. Ala. Code, § 5712 (1940) ; Ark. Dig. Stat., § 1274 (1937) ; Colo.
Stat. Ann., c. 176, § 247 (1937) ; Del. Rev. Code, § 4646-37 (1936) ; Ill. Rev.
Stat., c. 3, § 494 (1945) ; Ky. Rev. Stat., §411.140 (1943); Md. Code, art. 75,
§ 29 (1939) ; Neb. Rev. Stat., art. 14, § 25-1402 (1943); N. C. Gen. Stat.,
§ 28-172 (1943) ; Ohio Gen. Code, § 11397 (1938) ; Okla. Stat., tit. 12, § 1052
(1937) ; Pa. Stat., tit. 20, § 772 (1930) ; D. C. Code, § 12-101 (1941).
131. See Evans, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of
Tort Claims for and against Executors and Administrators," 29 Mich. L.
Rev. 696 (1931).
132. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., Inc., 162 P. 2d 133 (Ariz. 1945)
(motion to substitute administratrix on death of defendant during action for
unauthorized publication of photograph upheld). Note, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 114
(1946).
133. See note 129, supra.
134. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d
491 (1939) ; Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N. Y. Supp.
247 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
135. Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 447, 42 N. E. 22 (1896).
136. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930).
137. Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849 (1912).
138. N. Y. Civil Rights Law, § 51.
[Vol. 32:734
"PEACE OF MIND" IN 48 PIECES
right to a "living person," but those in Virginia'e0 and Utah140
confer it on survivors.
It is sufficient to note that the right is not extended beyond the
grave when recovery is had by surviving relatives and representa-
tives. It is their feelings of humiliation, not those of the deceased,
which'are given protection. By affirmatively answering these three
questions, a uniform statute on privacy would dispel existing doubt
and provide a desirable solution.
F. DISGUISED RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT
A uniform act on the right of privacy, if it accomplished nothing
else, would obviate the undesirable consequences of permitting re-
covery in such cases in the guise of some other right. The earliest
English cases involving what many courts today would label the
right of privacy were disposed of then on the basis of compromise
between immediate justice and deference to demands of stare decisis.
These decisions were first pegged on "property rights." This was
motivated by more than a desire to invest privacy with a cloak of
juristic respectability. The power of equity to enjoin the infringe-
ments of rights has often been held to extend only to the protection
of one's property. 4' The extremes to which English courts went to
find a "property" right demonstrate how much it served as a good
reason rather than a real one.' -4 2 A few American courts have em-
ployed the rationale of property rights in such cases' 43 and have
139. Va. Code, § 5782 (Michie et al., 1942).
140. Utah Code Ann., § 103-4-8 (1943).
141. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402 (1818) (a dictum often regarded
as a holding) ; Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912).
142. See Routh v. Webster, 10 Beav. 561, 50 Eng. Rep. 698 (1847)
(plaintiff's name incorrectly listed as director of corporation, held violation
of a property right because of possibility of suit in capacity of director;
Walter v. Ashton, (1902) 2 Chan. Div. 282, (defendant falsely advertised
bicycles used by London Times, held possible liability of newspaper for
misrepresentations a property right).
143. The leading case is Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134
S. W. 1076 (1911) (plaintiff, a five-year old child, recovered for publica-
tion of a likeness in advertisement over caption: "Papa Is Going to Buy
Mama an Elgin Watch for a Present; and Someone (I Musta't Tell Who)
Is Going to Buy My Big Sister a Diamond Ring. So Don't You Think You
Ought to Buy Me Something? The Payments are So Easy You'll Never
Miss the Money."). See also Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 433, 42 N. E.
22, 28 (1895) ("I cannot see why the right of privacy is not a form of
property, as much as is the right of complete immunity of one's person"-Judge
Gray, dissenting); Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280, 282, 31
L. R. A. 283 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) ("Independently of the question of contract,
I believe the law to be that a private individual has a right to be protected in
the representation of his portrait in any form; that this is a property as well as
a personal right") ; Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D & C 543 (1940) ("The
facial characteristics or peculiar cast of one's features .. .belong to the indi-
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shown considerable ingenuity in discovering them. 144
Manifestly, such efforts protect property rights only incidental-
ly. It is not expropriation of which the plaintiff complains when his
likeness has been published, but the disturbance to his emotional
well-being. Such judicial sublimation has two undesirable effects:
(1) By limiting recovery to those invasions which involve mone-
tary loss or gain it excludes relief where the damage is to mental
comfort and not to the pocketbook; (2) By identifying privacy
with commercial appropriation, it has caused more daring courts
to give relief for invasion of privacy in cases involving forms of
unfair competition.145 The danger is that the new tort will swallow
a host of other ones in the business field.146 Moreover, the reluc-
tance of equity to protect non-property rights is beginning to dis-
appear. All rights, both personal and property, are individual; and,
strictly speaking, there are no property rights, but only personal
ones.
47
American courts have frequently turned to fundamental law
either as a basis for relief or as justification for the existence of
the right. Courts have leaned on "natural law, ''114 the "pursuit of
happiness" of the Declaration of Independence 140 or state constitu-
vidual and may not be reproduced without his permission.") ; Edison v. Edison
Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq., 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907) (defendant
licensed to manufacture remedy for neuralgia compounded by Thomas A.
Edison, sold it with Edison's name and photograph on label; held property
rights infringed).
144. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (1907). The
court restrained the use of a husband's name on a birth certificate sought
by his wife for her adulterine child. A property right was found in the
possibility of suit by the child against the plaintiff for necessaries.
145. Eliot v. Jones, 66 Misc. 95, 120 N. Y. Supp. 989 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
146. In Waring v. W. D. A. S. Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433,
194 Atl. 631 (1937), Fred Waring sought to enjoin broadcast of recordings of
his arrangements. The majority of the court found a property right in the
orchestra's style of rendition as recorded. Maxey, J., concurred on grounds
of invasion of privacy. Cf. Restatement of Restitution, § 136, "a person who
has tortiously used a trade name, trade secret . . . or other similar interest of
another, is under a duty of restitution for the value of the benefit thereby
received."
147. In Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 790, 195 S. E.
55, 62 (1938), the court said: "All rights are individual. A person has a right
to the possession, control, use and disposition of property. This right is as
personal as the right to individual liberty, free speech or any other like
right possessed by a citizen. The individual right which relates to property
is loosely termed a property right. Some of the cases dealing with the 'right
of privacy' treat it as a species of property right." See also Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 193, 50 S. E. 68 (1905) ; Mau v. Rio
Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
148. See Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,
50 S. E. 68 (1905).
149. See Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (D.C.
1927).
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tion,l ' and due process clauses in state and federal constitutions.151
If such rationalizations are necessary, natural law and the Declara-
tion of Independence are, for that purpose, as imposing sources as
any, except that courts have never been so naive as to attempt to
give judicial content to the term "happiness." But in trying to find
constitutional basis for the right, courts are in error. Such restric-
tions as the due process clause are limitations only on governmental
action. They do not confer personal rights on an individual which
can be exercised against another.
15 2
Both English and American courts have permitted recovery
in privacy cases by striving to find breach of confidence,' 53 im-
plied contract,15 4 defamation,5 5  and even nuisance 58 and as-
sault. 7 The absurd predicament into which such reasoning may
sometimes lead a court appears in Pollard v. Photographic Co.'58
In that case, a photographer sold copies of the plaintiff's portrait
on Christmas cards. The court found an implied contract that the
negative was to be used only to fill the subject's order. Plaintiff's
counsel conceded that had the photograph been taken surreptitious-
ly, the defendant could freely exhibit it, since then there would
have been no consideration.
G. CONFLICT-OF-LAWS PROBLEMAS
One of the most urgent needs for uniform legislation on pri-
vacy arises from the difficulties found in that connection in the
field of conflict-of-laws. What choice of governing law is to be
151). Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
151. Set Munden v. Harris, 153 'Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911)
Pavesich %. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
152. Sce Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044
(1922).
153. Abernatly v. Hutchinson, (1825) 3 L. J. Ch. (Eng.) 209 (pub-
lication of oral lectures restrained).
154. Pollard v. Photographic Co., (1888) L. R. 40 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 345
(injunction against reproduction of unauthorized prints -n grounds of breach
of contract and breach of confidence) ; Stedall v. lloughton, (1901) 18
Times L. R. (Eng.) 126; McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria Co., 99 Colo.
499, 64 P. 2d 803 (1936) (use of photograph for advertising purposes);
Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P. 2d 535 (1932)
(use by undertaker of photograph of corpse of plaintiff's husband) ; Moore v.
Rugg, 44 'Minn. 28, 46 N. W. 141 (1890) (unauthorized delivery to third per-
son of copy of plaintiff's photograph).
155. Monson v. Tassaudes, Ltd., (1894) 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 671 (re-
covery in libel for exhibition of wax figure of plaintiff) ; Tolley v. J. S.
Fry & Sons, (1930) 1 K. B. (Eng.) 467 (recovery in libel for caricature of
golfer in advertisement of candy).
156. Pritchett v. Knox County, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N. E. 32 (1908)
(windows of jail with profane inmates overlooking plaintiff's residence).
157. McGlone v. Hauger, 56 Ind. App. 243, 104 N. E. 116 (1913).
158. (1888) L. R. 40 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 345.
19481
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made for a typical invasion involving most of the 48 states? The
problem is also presented, of course, by such multi-state torts as
libel, slander, disparagement or trade libel and most of the com-
petitive ones, such as unfair competition. But in the case of privacy,
it is made more acute by the silence of most states on the existence
of the right. The right can be found in Switzerland, France and
Scotland. 1' 9 It has the judicial recognition of California, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina, as well as that of Alaska, the District of Columbia, and
federal courts.1 60 New York, Virginia and Utah have passed statutes
providing for the right in circumscribed form.1 6' Only in Rhode
Island, on the basis of actual holdings, is there no legally recog-
nized right of privacy.16 2 The courts of three other states have con-
sidered the matter. In two, Michigan' 3 and Wisconsin,'6 4 there
will probably be no judicial recognition. In the third, Washing-
ton, 65 recent tendencies have been more favorable. Twenty-seven
states have never passed on it. Thus, as distinguished from the
usual variations among states as to the scope of a tort, with respect
to the existence itself of the right of privacy on the American
jurisdictional checkerboard, 27 of the 48 spaces are blank.
Under no choice of law principle can a substantive rule be indi-
cated where none exists. But even among states where some action
has been taken with respect to the right, no conflicts rule has been
formulated which will adequately designate governing law in an
action for its multi-state invasion. Consideration of several pro-
posed solutions indicates why courts and counsel have happily
ignored the problem in almost all of the cases:
(1) Substantive law of forum. Since the court in which the
action is brought can more easily determine its own substantive
law than it can ascertain that of another jurisdiction, it might ap-
159. Gutteridge and Walton, "The Comparative Law of the Right of
Privacy," 47 L. Q. Rev. 203, 218 (1931).
160. Note, 138 A. L. R. 28, 29 (1942) (cases collected).
161. N. Y. Civil Rights Law, §§ 50, 51; Va. Code, § 5782 (Michie
et al., 1942) ; Utah Code Ann., §§ 103-4-7-103-4-9 (1943).
162. Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909).
163. Cf. De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N. W. 146 (1881) with
Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899);
Miller v. Gillespie, 196 Mich. 423, 163 N. W. 22 (1917).
164. See Judevine v. Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512,
269 N. W. 295 (1936) ; Schultz v. Frankfort Mut. Accident & P. G. Ins.
Co., 151 Wis. 537, 159 N. W. 386 (1913).
165. See Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 127 Wash.
252, 177 P. 2d 896 (1947) ; Note, 22 Wash. L. Rev. 229 (1947).
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pear convenient for the forum always to provide the governing
law in multi-state cases. But the forum is not invariably the juris-
diction most significantly connected with the controversy, and to
make the outcome vary with the forum violates this basic tenet of
conflicts. Since jurisdiction over defendants responsible for nation-
wide communications may be had in almost any state, the plaintiff
could "shop around" for the most favorable substantive rule and
most liberal damages.
(2) Place of last event. At least one case 66 has applied the
Restatement'1 7 choice-of-law rule that the governing law is to be
supplied by the place where the "last event" takes place which is
"necessary to make an actor liable." In privacy situations, this is
the place where publication occurs. In radio and television, trans-
mission is both simultaneous and multi-jurisdictional, and deter-
mination of the place of first impact would require the atomic ac-
curacy of the physicist.
(3) Point, of origination. The place of the act has often been
suggested as the state to provide the governing law.'168 This would
give publishing and broadcasting defendants opportunity to select a
favorable jurisdiction for operations. What is the point of origin
for periodicals which are edited in one state and printed in another,
or those printed and shipped from two states ?"0
(4) State of principal circulation. Some have suggested that
governing law should be provided by the state of principal circula-
tion.1 7" This rule would amount, in effect, to the adoption of the
New York substantive law. This seems undesirable since the New
York right, a statutory one, is decidedly limited in scope.
(5) Doinicil of the plaintiff. The domicil of the plaintiff might
offer suitable governing law. Disturbance to a person's peace of
mind probably has its most significant contact there. However, the
rule breaks down for individuals with multiple domicils. Plaintiffs
of national prominence might suffer more from invasions of their
privacy elsewhere than at home. For publishers and broadcasters
this rule would spell chaos and no predictable standard of conduct
would be provided.
166. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.
N.Y. 1939).
167. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 377 (1934).
168. Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 252 (1942) ; Cook, Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 315-18 (1942).
169. Cf. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(periodical printed and shipped from two cities).
170. Cf. Palmer v. Mahin, 120 Fed. 737, 746 (C.C.A. 8th 1903).
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These proposals for a choice of law principle, all pointing to
substantive rules of a single state, are inadequate. A conflicts prin-
ciple designating the rules of the plurality of states in which cir-
culation occurred would only add to confusion.17 ' Moreover, there
can be no assurance of judicial determinations to fill the hiatus in
the substantive law itself. Only a uniform statute can provide a
satisfactory solution. Congress itself might undertake such an enact-
ment. However, limitations on federal jurisdiction would result in
dual rules: a federal statute for multi-state invasions superimposed
upon the present welter of judicial dissonance governing intra-
state ones. Previous state experience and the Congress' reluctance
to enact legislation affecting the press suggest that the solution, if
any, must be by uniform state act.
H. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING STATUTES
The need for uniform legislation on the right privacy is also
indicated by the inadequacy of existing statutes. Of the three in
effect, the New York one 72 is the prototype and the most fre-
quently construed by the courts. Designed to meet criticism of
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 73 this statute is drawn no
more broadly than to overrule that decision. Section 50 makes the
use of a living person's name, portrait or picture for advertising or
trade purposes without first having obtained written consent a mis-
demeanor. With some unimportant exceptions, section 51 gives
such person a civil remedy by injunction or damages. The jury is
given discretion to award exemplary damages where the conduct is
wilful. The effect has been similar to the relief granted by those
jurisdictions which recognize the right of privacy only in the dis-
guise of one of property: it narrows protection to commercial ex-
ploitations of names, portraits and likenesses. While this is the
most common form of invasion of privacy, other flagrant types
remediable at common law are not actionable. Since only the use
of a name or likeness is within the statute's prohibition, publica-
tion of the most intimate details of private life are outside its scope.
Publication for political or personal motives, no matter how much
mental disquiet is caused, apparently would not be actionable. Nu-
merous invasions such as wiretapping, eavesdropping, shadowing
and the like amounting to intrusions without involving publication
are outside the statute's protection even though actionable at com-
171. Cf O'Reilly v. Curtis Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
172. N. Y. Civil Rights Law, §§ 50, 51.
173. 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
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mon law. Invasions involving deceased persons, public institutions,
corporations and partnerships are not remediable. The coupling of
the civil remedies with the criminal provision, although the latter
is rarely invoked, has caused courts to characterize the statute as
penal and to construe it strictly. 7 4 Its legislative history has been
mentioned to justify the interpretation that the statute embraces
only situations analogous to the Roberson case and no others'7 5
The requirement of written consent has led in some situations
to unjust results.17 6
The statutes in Virginia 7 and Utah'7 8 have been rarely invoked
and have had only slight influence on the development of the right
in other states. Like the New York statute, both limit protection
to commercial use of names, portraits and likenesses, require ad-
vance written consent, penalize invasions as misdemeanors, and
provide for injunction, civil and exemplary damages. Both are more
liberal in extending the right to representatives of deceased per-
sons and parents or guardians of minors. The Utah statute, unlike
that of New York or Virginia, also protects public institutions and
the titles of public officers of the State. 7 9 The Virginia statute is
more limited than the others in that protection is extended only to
residents.1 0
II
Examination of over half-century of legislative and judicial
experience with the right of privacy suggests the contours of a
desirable uniform statute. It ought to include intrusions upon pri-
vate affairs as well as publications. As for the latter, word por-
trayals should be just as actionable as use of a name, portrait or
picture. The right should be extended not only to living persons
but to representatives of deceased ones and to parents or guardians
for minors. The purpose of the interference should not be restricted
to trade or advertising. It should include invasions actuated by
personal malice and for political purposes. Indeed it ought to cover
174. See Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376,
152 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dept. 1915) ; Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co.,
Inc., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. Supp. 999 (2d Dept. 1914); Binns v.
Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913).
175. Jackson v. Consumer Pub. Co., Inc., 169 Misc. 1022, 10 N. Y. S.
2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 965, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 694 (1st Dept.
1939) ; Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
176. See note 126, supra.
177. Va. Code, § 5782 (Michie et al., 1942).
178. Utah Code Ann., §§ 103-4-7-103-4-9 (1943).
179. Id., § 103-4-7.
180. See note 177, supra.
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any interference the object of which does not subserve dissemina-
tion of news, furtherance of education, administration of law or
other legitimate public interest. It should be immaterial whether the
invasion is written or oral. Recovery ought not to vary with the
medium of publication. Written consent in advance should not be
required to escape liability. Any consent, whether before or after,
written or oral, should be sufficient. To avoid strict construction
to which a remedial statute of this type ought not to be subjected,
no penal liability should attach. Damages for injuries sustained,
exemplary damages for wilful invasions and injunction to prevent
and restrain infringements, should be sufficient sanction. A possible
statute embodying these considerations appears in the Appendix.
In states having a statutory action at present, the proposed uniform
act would enlarge the right and overcome many inadequacies. In
other states recognizing the right, it would provide a more pre-
dictable standard of what constitutes invasion. In still other states,
the undesirable consequences of disguised recognition of the right
would be obviated. And for the majority of states, it would forth-
with resolve doubt as to the right's existence. For all states, the
puzzle of choice of law in multi-state invasions would be solved.
The adoption of such a uniform act by a number of states would
do much to dispel present confusion.
APPENDIX
Proposed Uniform Act
on
Right of Privacy
§1.0-Definition. Any person, firm or corporation that interferes
with any living person, or with a deceased's memory, by intruding,
in an unreasonable and serious manner upon the private activities
of the living, or by making known in like manner the private af-
fairs of any one, living or deceased, or by exposing such person to
the public by substantial use of his name, portrait, picture, like-
ness or by other means sufficient to identify him, shall be liable
for invasion of his privacy, except as hereinafter provided.
§1.1-Justification. The interference shall be justified and not
actionable if its purpose is the dissemination of news, furtherance
of education, administration of law, or other end of legitimate pub-
lic interest.
§'1.2-Consent. The interference shall not be actionable if the
person interfered with gives his consent, whether written pr oral.
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In the case of minors, their parents or guardians must consent,
and in that of deceased persons, their heirs or personal representa-
tives.
§1.3-Photographers. This statute shall not apply to commer-
cial photographers who exhibit specimens of their work about their
establishment, unless they continue to do so after protest, whether
written or oral, of the person portrayed.
§1.4-Manufacturers or dealers. This statute shall not apply to
any person, firm or corporation which uses the name, portrait or
likeness of any manufacturer or dealer in connection with goods
which he himself has previously disposed of under such name or
mark of identification.
§1.5-Artists or composers. This statute shall not apply to any
person, firm or corporation which uses the name, portrait or like-
ness of an author, composer or artist, in connection with produc-
tions which he himself has previously disposed of under such name
or mark of identification.
§2.0-Renwdy. Injunction. Any person under §1 whose pri-
vacy has or may be invaded is entitled to maintain an equitable
action for an injunction in order to restrain or prevent it. If the
person is a minor, the action may be brought by his parent or
guardian, or if he is deceased, by his heirs or personal representa-
tives.
§2.1-Damages. Any person whose privacy has been invaded and
for whom a remedy is provided under §2.0 may also sue and recover
damages for injuries which he has sustained. If the invasion is
wilful, he may be awarded damages of an exemplary nature.
§2.2-Abatement. An action under §2 shall not abate because
of the death of plaintiff or defendant.
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